Abstract-With the recent growing number of cyber-attacks and the constant lack of effective and state-of-art defense methods, cyber risks become ubiquitous in enterprise networks, manufacturing plants, and government computer systems. Cyberinsurance has become one of the major ways to mitigate the risks as it can transfer the cyber-risks to insurance companies and improve the security status of the insured. The designation of effective cyber-insurance policies requires the considerations from both the insurance market and the dynamic properties of the cyber-risks. To capture the interactions between the users and the insurers, we present a dynamic moral-hazard type of principalagent model incorporated with Markov decision processes which are used to capture the dynamics and correlations of the cyberrisks as well as the user's decisions on the local protections. We study and fully analyze a case where the user has two states, and two actions and the insurer provides linear coverage insurance. We show the Peltzman effect, linear insurance policy principle, and zero-operating profit principle of the optimal cyberinsurance policy. Numerical experiments are provided to verify our conclusions further and extend to cases of a four-state threeaction user under linear coverage insurance and a threshold coverage insurance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in Internet of things [1] , cyber-physical systems [2] , and smart cities [3] have largely improved the efficiency of industrial plants and critical infrastructures as well as the quality of our daily life. With a large number of devices connected via networks, however, cyber-attacks such as ransomware [4] , data breaches [5] , and denial-of-services [6] have become severe threats to the security of important devices and private data [7] . For example, the CryptoLocker ransomware attack has caused an estimated loss of $ 3 million [8] . The 2016 Dyn cyberattack has resulted in the disruption of major Internet platforms and services to large swathes of users in Europe and North America [9] .
To defend against the cyber-attacks, various methods such as firewalls [10] , intrusion detection systems [11] , and movingtarget defenses [12] have been deployed to protect the networked devices. These techniques have created defense mechanisms to detect intrusion attempts and anomaly of the networks and mitigate the impact of the attacks on the system. Despite a wide deployment of the defense technologies, these defense methods cannot eliminate the cyber-risks due to the complexities of the devices and cyber-environments [13] . Moreover, R. Zhang and Q. Zhu are with Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, NY, 11201 Email:{rz885,qz494}@nyu.edu. Fig. 1 . Example of the cyber-insurance. The blue, red, and the green icons represent the user, the attacker, and the insurer, respectively. The user faces risks of various cyber-attacks, which result in severe losses; however, after paying a premium, the insurer covers parts of that loss, and as a result, user's risks are transferred to the insurer. the growing sophistication of the attacks, cyber-threats are becoming stealthier, more strategic and purposeful as exemplified by the advanced persistent threats such as Stuxnet attacks on Iranian nuclear power plant in 2009 and the Ukrainian power plant attack in 2015 [14] , [15] . These events have witnessed the complex evolution of hacking techniques which has made it more challenging and costly for the system designers to defend.
From the perspective of system administrators, perfect security or design of a risk-free system is either impossible or cost-prohibitive [16] . The mere focus on security hardening does not eliminate risk but only reduces risks and sometimes unfortunately creates new unknown risks. Therefore, a paradigm shift toward resilience and risk mitigation is essential for further reducing the physical and financial impact of the cyber-attacks. One important mechanism to achieve this objective is cyber-insurance [17] - [21] , which has been developed as an effective method to mitigate the cyber-risks and a valuable additional layer of protection against cyberattacks. The insured network users could quickly recover from severe cyber-incidents, as part of the losses have been covered by the insurance companies. Moreover, since the premium fee is usually low compared to other protection methods, the users have the freedom to spend more on the upgrades of the servers and systems, and they are also able to afford advanced defense and protection software or hardware, which can further reduce the risks of cyber-failures. Thus, cyber-insurance provides an economically viable solution to largely improve network resiliency.
The research on the cyber-insurance market, however, lacks sufficient data and information on the cyber-incidents and their impacts on the network users, thus, the analysis and designation from the history data may not be accurate and trustworthy [22] . Moreover, collecting sufficient trustful data is not only time-consuming but also easily outdated as the tremendous and fast-growing amounts and types of the cyber-failures [23] . As a result, it is crucial to building an effective cyber-insurance model that can be used to quantify the evolution of cyber-risks and guide the design of the insurance contracts.
Like the classical insurance, cyber-insurance aims to mitigate the risks of the insured to the insurance companies. Thus, a natural way to model and analyze cyber-insurance is to build on top of the existing insurance framework [17] , [24] , [25] . One common feature of the insurance is the information asymmetry between the insured and the insurers, which can be studied using moral hazard models in the economics literature [26] - [28] . However, a direct application of these models does not fully capture unique features of cyber-risks as cyber-risks involve attack behaviors that make the cyber-risks harder to estimate (See Fig. 1 ).
One important feature of cyber-risks is that attack behavior correlates multiple types of risks [29] - [31] . For example, an adversary can first launch a node capture attack to compromise the system [32] , [33] , and then gain the administration to the devices [34] , steal private information [35] , or inject Ransomware worms or virus [36] . In that case, a cyberinsurance targeting Ransomware should also consider other cyber-risks, e.g., the unauthorized data collection, the data breach, and system disruption, as they can also indicate the potential threats of the Ransomware to the insured. As a result, the designation of cyber-insurance policies should consider the correlations and interconnections of cyber-risks and their combined impacts to the networked systems and devices.
Furthermore, the attack behaviors can make cyber-risks dynamically evolving and significantly varying within a short period of time [37] . On one hand, the adversaries can change his objectives and actions, which can lead to different impacts on the users' risks and cause various types of losses. For example, an attacker may first take control of the device and steal private information [5] . As he finds the vulnerabilities of the system, he strategically chooses to inject Ransomware software for maximum damages [4] . On the other hand, the insured have a choice of the local protections, and they can adaptively reconfigure the defense policies. One example is that a user can choose different security settings for firewalls, detection rules for intrusion detection systems, randomization schemes for moving target defense during the spreading of computer viruses and worms. The defender's behavior in response to the attacks can create rapid change of cyber-risks over time.
To address these features of the cyber-insurance, we capture the correlations and dynamics of the cyber-risks as well as the users' decisions on the local protections with the Markov decision processes (MDP) [38] , [39] . Different states of the MDP are used to capture the different cyber-risks from various sources, such as service failures, attackers, or network connections. The transitions of states capture the connections of different cyber-risks, and they are affected by the user's actions of local protections at different times. By solving the MDP problem, the user aims to find the optimal protection policy that reduces his cyber-risks.
To further mitigate the cyber-risks, the user has a choice of the cyber-insurance. By paying a premium, the user will receive a coverage from the insurer once he encounters a loss. Although the cyber-insurance directly reduces the losses of the user by covering parts of them, however, it could lead to an increase on the cyber-risks which could increase the losses of the user, as the user has no incentive to use better local protections knowing that he is covered by the insurance. The phenomenon of this reckless behavior under the insurance is usually referred as the Peltzman effect [40] , which will be shown and analyzed in detail in this paper.
A rational user will select a cyber-insurance from which he could benefit more, i.e., a policy with a low premium and a high coverage. However, an insurer tends to offer insurance that has a high premium and a low coverage, as the insurer aims to maximize his operating profit. Moreover, similar to the traditional insurance scenarios, the cyber insurer is not aware of the local protection actions or policies of the user, and an inappropriate insurance policy could largely damage the insurer's profit. We address such conflicting interests and the information asymmetry between the user and the insurer with a moral hazard type of principal-agent problem where the insurer is not aware of the user's actions on the local protections [27] , [28] , [41] , [42] . The analysis, as well as the solution of the problem, is important on the designations of effective insurance policies.
The major contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• We use a dynamic moral hazard type of principal-agent model to establish a cyber-insurance framework to capture the information asymmetry between a user and an insurer. The insurer acts as a principle who has incomplete information of the user's behaviors, while the user has a complete information of his actions.
• We capture the dynamics of the user's cyber-risks and his decisions on local protections using Markov Decision Processes (MDP). The impacts of the cyber-insurance on the user's decisions are reflected by the losses from the cyber-risks and the user's rational choice of subscriptions.
• We develop computational methods and analytical tools to design the optimal cyber-insurance contracts. We show that the insurer has a zero-operating profit when the user does not change his local protections under the optimal insurance policy.
• We characterize the optimal insurance contract solutions for the case between a two-state two-action user and a linear coverage insurer. The reactions of the user to the insurance policy and the consequences of such reactions to the insurer can be fully characterized.
• We demonstrate the Peltzman effect as a result of the developed framework and show that user tends to choose weak local protections when the insurer provides a high coverage.
• We discover the linear insurance policy principle in which the premium of the insurance is proportional to the coverage. Moreover, we observe that the insurer has a zero-operating profit with low coverage insurance policies, a negative profit with high coverage policy, and the linear insurance policy principle.
• We present numerical experiments on the interactions between users with more states and actions and insurers with threshold insurance policies. We show that Peltzman effect, zero-operating profit, and negative operating profit are still valid in these cases.
A. Related Works
Recently, with fast-growing types and amounts of the networked devices and shortages of effective and state-of-art defense methods, cyber-insurance has drawn huge attentions as it can transfer the unexpected cyber-risks to the insurance companies [17] - [23] . The existing insurance framework could bring useful insights on modeling the cyber-insurance [17] , [24] , [25] . The moral hazard models in the economics literature are good tools to capture the information asymmetric between the insured and the insurers [26] - [28] . However, the dynamics and correlations of the cyber-risks make it inappropriate to directly apply the current insurance frameworks and models on cyberinsurance.
Various works have studied the dynamics and correlations of the cyber-risks with different methodologies and models [43] - [45] . In [46] , Poolsappasit et al. have used a bayesian attack graphs model to analyze the network security risk assessment and mitigation. In [47] , the authors have used a differential epidemic model to capture the spreading of virus and worms in the computer network. However, most of these works aim to reduce the impacts of cyber-risks through local protections, such as firewalls [10] , intrusion detection [34] , or moving target defenses [12] , which cannot fully mitigate the risks of cyber-attacks. Studies of the impacts of the cyber-insurance on the cyber-risks are still lacking.
Some of the recent works on cyber-insurance have taken into account the network effects of the cyber-risks. In [17] , Kesan et al. have examined the cyber-insurance industry and showed that cyber-insurance increases the level of the security of networked systems, and thus result in higher overall social welfare. In [21] , Zhang et al. have studied the interactions between users, attackers, and the insurers with a bi-level gametheoretic framework in a networked environment. However, their models have not captured the dynamics and correlations of the cyber-risks, and thus may fail in some situations.
In this work, we will focus on studying the dynamics and correlations of the cyber-risks and analyzing the impacts of the cyber-insurance to both the insured and the insurers. We will first capture the cyber-risks as well as the user's deployments of local protections with Markov decision processes, which have been used variously to analyze cybersecurity [48] , [49] . We then use the existing moral hazard type of principal-agent model to capture the interactions between the user and the insurer with incomplete information. The analysis of both the optimal insurance policy and the user's response to it provides useful insights on the designation of the cyber-insurance in the real world.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we establish the game-theoretic models for the user and the insurer. Section III deals with the scientific methods for the user and the insurer. Section IV presents a case study of a linear coverage insurance policy on a two-state two-action user. Section V and Section VI present numerical results and concluding remarks, respectively. Appendices A, B, C, D, and E provide the proof of the Propositions 1, 2 and Lemma 1, respectively.
II. A GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK OF CYBER-INSURANCE
In this section, we present a game-theoretic model of cyber insurance which involves two players: User and Insurer. We first provide an overview of the interactions between the user and the insurer, then we will fully capture both the user's problem and the insurer's problem.
A. User and Insurer
Because of the cyber-attacks caused by the adversaries, a user who employs networked devices often faces losses from cyber-risks. To reduce such losses, the user can use local protections and deploy defense tools against attackers. However, such actions are costly, moreover, they cannot eliminate the threats from cyber-attacks. To further mitigate the cyber-risks, the user could purchase the cyber-insurance from the insurer. By paying a premium, the user will receive financial coverages from the insurer once he is attacked by the adversaries. The objective of the user is to find an optimal deployments of local protections and cyber-insurance such that the total effective losses, e.g., the sum of the direct losses caused by cyberattacks, costs of local protections, and the premium of the insurance, are minimized.
The insurer provides the cyber-insurance, and aims to design an optimal insurance policy to maximize his own profit, which is equal to the premium charged to the user subtracting the total coverage provided to the user. However, a rational user will purchase the insurance only when the total effective losses under the insurance is lower than the total effective losses without the insurance. As a result, the user prefers insurance policy with a low premium and high coverage, which is contrary to the insurer's interests. Thus, it is natural to consider a game-theoretic framework to capture the conflicting interests of the user and the insurer.
One important feature of the interactions between the user and the insurer is that the insurer has incomplete information of the user, i.e., the insurer cannot observe the local protections of the user. The consequences of the information asymmetry are severe for the insurer due to the Peltzman effect in the insurance literature. Since the user aims to minimize the total effective losses, a reasonable action for him is to take weak local protections when he is protected by the insurance, and such reckless behavior under the insurance is usually referred as Peltzman effect. Although the user will have lower total losses after the insurance coverage, the insurer will be required (a) Cyber Risks and Real Losses.
(b) States and Direct Losses. Fig. 2 . We use the states in the MDP framework to capture the various types of cyber-risks and their dynamics and correlations. We measure various types and quantities of the real losses into direct losses, where a higher direct loss indicates a higher consequence of the cyber-risk.
to pay the extra losses caused by the reduced local protections of the user, which will largely reduce the profit of the insurer. Thus, an optimal insurance policy should not only take into account the user's rational choices of purchasing the insurance but also anticipate the user's reckless behaviors under the coverage. In this paper, we aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the user's behaviors under the insurance and their consequences to the insurer, and further offer useful insights on the designation of the optimal cyber insurance policies. We capture the interactions between the user and the insurer by a moral-hazard type of principal-agent problem, which has been variously used in the insurance literature.
Due to the dynamics and correlations of the cyber-risks, the traditional static principal-agent framework cannot be directly applied to model the interactions between the user and the insurer of the cyber insurance. We further consider a dynamic principal-agent model which incorporates a Markov Decision Process to capture the evolvements of the user's actions and cyber-risks with time. In the following subsections, we fully capture and analyze the user's problem and the insurer's problem separately. An optimization problem is formulated to find the optimal insurance policies.
B. User's Problem
The user aims to find an efficient way to mitigate the loss caused by the cyber-attacks. The user can either use local protections or purchase cyber insurance. To capture the two options in our framework, we allow the user to decide his local protections against cyber-attacks as well as his rational choice of participation in the insurance program. We first use Markov decision processes to capture the dynamics and correlations of the cyber-risks and the user's deployments of local protections.
Let s t ∈ S ≡ {s i |1 ≤ i ≤ n} denote the state of the user at time t for t ∈ Z ≥0 . The state s can represent different types of cyber-risks encountered by the user. For example, s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 in Fig. 2 indicate that the user is facing data breaches, under service failures, and injected Ransomware, respectively. Specially, s t 1 = s 3 indicates that the user is injected Ransomware at time t 1 . Note that different states can indicate the same cyber-risk but with different consequences. s 4 also indicates that the user is under Ransomware, but s 3 causes the user to lose data as he is not willing to pay the attacker, while s 4 causes him to lose money as he needs to pay the attacker to restore the data. The size of the states n ∈ Z ≥1 is related to the user's systems. A more complicated system usually has a larger size of states as the attacker can compromise the system with various methods and objectives.
One important feature of cyber attacks is that the states of the user are correlated. For example, if the user is under node capture attacks at time t, he will have a larger probability of facing data losses at time t + 1 as the attacker can launch continuous attacks to compromise the system. To capture that, we use p(s t , s t+1 ) with p : S × S → [0, 1] to denote the transition probability that the user goes to state s t+1 at time t + 1 when he is currently in state s t . It is natural to achieve that ∑ s∈S p(s t , s) = 1 as the user can only enter the states in S .
At different states s t , the user has different cyber-risks, which will result in different types of real losses, e.g., data losses, physical device damages, and compromised financial accounts as shown in Fig. 2 . In this paper, we consider that all types of the real losses can be transformed into the direct losses x ∈ R ≥0 . Note that the direct losses x are measured by the consequences of the real losses, and a larger consequence of the real loss will lead to a larger direct loss. One benefit of using a unified measure is that all types of the cyber-risks can now be quantified by the direct losses. We further use x t = f (s t ) to denote the direct loss of the user at time t, where f : S → R ≥0 .
To reduce the direct losses caused by the attacker, the user can use various local protection methods, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and moving-target defenses. We use a t ∈ A ≡ {a j |1 ≤ j ≤ m} to denote the local protections of the user at time t. The impacts of the local protections are reflected on the transition probabilities. For example, the user will have a lower probability of entering states with higher direct losses when he has better local protections. To capture that, we redefine p(s t , a t , s t+1 ) as the transition probability that the user will go to state s t+1 in the next step when he adopts local protection a t in state s t , and p :
The objective of the user is to find an optimal sequence of actions {a t } t∈Z ≥0 that minimizes the expected total direct losses which can be captured as
where c : A → R ≥0 captures the cost of local protections. γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discounted ratio indicating that future losses are valued less at time 0. The sum over an infinite horizon is due to the fact that cyber-attacks can frequently happen in a short period of time. Note that the expected total direct losses are conditioned on the initial state s 0 . An illustration of the user's cyber-risks and the local protections under the insurance can be found in Fig. 3 . Besides the local protections, the user can also mitigate his losses by purchasing cyber insurance. With paying a premium T ∈ R ≥0 , the user will get a coverage of r(x t ) when he faces a loss of x t , where r : R ≥0 → R ≥0 . Clearly, the coverage function r satisfies r(x t ) ≤ x t as the insurer can only provide the coverage to the losses. We further use R to denote the set of all possible coverage functions. As a result, the user's effective loss under the insurance at time t can be captured as x t − r(x t ) + c(a t ). The expected total effective losses can now be captured as follows:
To achieve his objective, the user has various choices of sequences of actions. For example, he can randomly pick actions at each time t. In this paper, we consider a rational user who decides his actions based on his current states. Such feedback strategy helps the user maintain his security level by adopting the necessary local protections, which can reduce the losses from cyber attacks and save the costs of local protections at the same time. The strategy is usually denoted by a stationary protection policy π : S → A . As a result, the expected total effective losses of the user under a stationary protection policy can be captured as follows:
where J : S × Ω × R → R ≥0 . Note that Ω captures the set of all possible stationary policies.
The user now aims to find an optimal stationary protection policy π * ∈ Ω that minimizes his expected total losses, and such objective can be captured as follows:
where υ : S × R → R ≥0 denotes the total expected effective losses under the optimal protection policy π * , and it is a function of the initial state s and the coverage function r. Clearly, υ(s, r) = J(s, π * , r). Given different coverage functions r, the user can find different optimal protection policies π * by solving Problem (4). We further use g : R → Ω to denote the best response of the user to the insurance coverage function r, i.e., the optimal protection policy π * = g(r) for a coverage function r. Thus, we have υ(s, r) ≡ J(s, g(r), r) and achieve
Since the insurer covers parts of the direct losses, the user will tend to choose weak local protections as they cost less, which may increase the direct losses, and such reckless behaviors are captured as Peltzman effect, which may further increase the total effective losses. Thus, a rational user will choose to purchase the insurance only when the expected total effective loss under the insurance is lower than the loss without insurance, which can be captured as follows: (6) where s indicates the initial state of the user. T indicates the premium of the insurance. r 0 indicates a zero coverage function, i.e., r 0 : R ≥0 → 0. It corresponds to the case when there is no insurance. g(r 0 ) returns the optimal protection policy of the user in this case. The user will purchase the insurance only when Inequality (6) is satisfied, which must be considered by the insurer while designing insurance policies. Fig. 3 . Cyber Insurance Example. The dynamics of the user's risks are captured by Markov decision processes with s t denoting the cyber-risks at time t, which are associated with different losses x t . The user can choose various local protections a t to reduce the future losses. The objective of the user is to find the optimal local protection action sequence {a t } t≥0 which minimizes his total losses. The user can also purchase the cyber insurance to mitigate his losses. The insurer first announces the insurance policy {T,r}, where T and r indicate the premium and the coverage function. The user can decide whether to purchase the insurance or not. If the user chooses to purchase the insurance, he will pay a premium T , and when he faces a loss of x, the insurer will provide a coverage of r(x). The objective of the insurer is to maximize his profit. Note that the insurer has no information of the user's actions.
C. Insurer's Problem
In this subsection, we will present the insurer's problem of maximizing his operating profits. An illustration of the interactions between the user and the insurer are provided in Fig. 3 . The insurer first announces the insurance policy {T, r}, where T ∈ R ≥0 and r ∈ R indicate the premium and the coverage function, respectively. Then, the user makes the decision of purchasing the insurance and finds the optimal protection policy on the local protections. If the user chooses to purchase the insurance, the insurer will earn a profit of T at time 0, but the insurer is required to pay the coverage of r(x t ) when the user faces a loss of x t at time t. The operating profit of the insurer can thus be captured as
where E{r(x t ) s 0 = s} denotes the expected total coverage provided by the insurer, and s 0 indicates the initial state of the user. The objective of the insurer is to find an optimal insurance policy {T * , r * } that maximizes his operating profit. As a result, the insurer's problem can be captured as
The constraint in Problem 8 comes from Inequality (6), and it is satisfied so that the user will purchase the insurance. By solving Problem (8), the insurer can find an optimal insurance policy which maximizes his operating profit and will be accepted by the user. Note that the insurer has no information of the user's actions, but he is aware of the user's initial state and the user's losses.
By combing the user's problem and the insurer's problem, the interactions of the user and the insurer can be captured by the following principal-agent problem:
The objective function describes the insurer's goal to maximize his operating profit. Constraint (9a) captures the user's rational choice of purchasing the insurance. Constraint (9b) is the user's problem of minimizing his total effective losses by selecting the optimal protection policy π * . Note that the user may have different optimal protection policies under a different insurance coverage r. The insurer can now find the optimal insurance policy by solving Problem (9) . Problem (9) is an optimization problem nested with various sub-optimization problems. The solution of Problem (9) captures both the insurer's objective of maximizing his own profit and the user's objective of minimizing his total effective losses with the consideration of the user's rational choice of purchasing the insurance. To find the solution of Problem (9), we can first solve the user's problem (5) and obtain the best response of the user g(r) and the corresponding losses υ(s, r) = J(s, g(r), r) to the coverage r ∈ R, and then achieve T * , r * by solving the insurer's problem (8) . In the following section, we will provide methods of solving the user's problem and simplifications of the insurer's problem.
III. SCIENTIFIC METHODS
To find the optimal insurance policy of the insurer, we need to first solve the user's problem (5) and find the best response g(r) of the user to the coverage function r. Notice that the user's problem under a given coverage function r is Markov decision processes (MDP). Thus, we can solve it by traditional MDP tools such as dynamic programming and linear programming. We will discuss them separately in the following subsections.
A. User's Problem: Dynamic Programming Approach
Recall equation (3), let us define l :
, which indicates the effective loss at time t under the coverage function r. Note that π(s t ) denotes the action of the user at state s t under the policy π. Thus, we can express the expected total effective losses as follows:
Note that the first term and the second term of the second equation capture the effective loss at time 0, and the future losses, respectively. As a result, given a coverage function r ∈ R, g(r) = π * and υ(s, r) = J(s, π * , r) can be found by the following dynamic programming operator [50] :
(12) By iterating (11) and (12) for all states until no further changes take place, we will achieve π * and υ(s, r). The convergence to the optimal policy is guaranteed. As a result, we can find the best response g(r) of the user by dynamic programming for every possible coverage function r.
B. User's Problem: Linear Programming Approach
Besides the dynamic programming, we can also use linear programming to solve the user's problem. The user's problem (4) can be reformulated as a linear programming problem in the standard form as follows: min
with its dual problem
η ∈ R nm×1 and ρ ∈ R n×1 are denoted as the prime variable and the dual variable, respectively. Note that n and m are the sizes of state set S and action set A , respectively. b ∈ R n×1 is a column vector of size n with all the elements equal to The matrix E ∈ R n×nm satisfies that E i,n(i−1)+ j = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and all the other elements are 0. P ∈ R n×nm is the transition probability matrix where
The optimal primal variable η * represents the optimal stateaction frequencies. The optimal dual variable ρ * represents the expected cost-to-go values of the states for the given coverage function r, i.e., ρ * i = υ(s i , r) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. After solving the dual problem, we can find the optimal protection policy π * under the coverage function r by solving (11) . As a result, the best response g(r) of the user can be found by solving the linear programming problems for every coverage function r.
C. Insurer's Problem: Simplifications and Direct Conclusions
In the previous subsections, we have presented dynamic programming and linear programming for finding the optimal protection policy π * of the user under the coverage function r. Then, we can then obtain the optimal insurance policy {T * , r * } by solving the insurer's Problem (8) , which can be further simplified using the solution of the user's problem. We note that the expected total coverage is equal to the expected total direct losses minus the expected total effective losses, i.e., , g(r) , r) denote the expected total direct losses and the expected total effective losses, respectively. Here, g(r) is the optimal protection policy of the user under the coverage function r, and r 0 indicates a zero coverage function. As a result, Problem (8) can be rewritten as follows:
Note that the constraint indicates that the maximum premium that can be charged by the insurer for a coverage function r satisfies that
For any premium T > T max under the coverage function r, the user will choose not to purchase the insurance as the losses under the insurance are higher than the losses without insurance.
As a result, Problem (8) is equivalent to the following problem by plugging (13):
The constraint here indicates that the premium T max ≥ 0. By solving (14), we can find the optimal coverage function, and then the optimal premium can be obtained by (13) . Similarly, the principal-agent problem of the user and the insurer can also be rewritten as follows:
Thus, with the best response g(r) of the user, we can easily find the optimal insurance policy through (14) and (15) . One useful insight could be obtained without solving the user's problem, which is summarized in the following remark. Proof. We have J(s, g(r 0 ), r 0 ) − J(s, g(r), r 0 ) ≤ 0 from (15b), i.e., g(r 0 ) ∈ arg min π∈Ω J(s, π, r 0 ). Thus, if g(r) = g(r 0 ), the operating profit is zero; otherwise, the operating profit is negative. As a result, the optimal insurance policy satisfies g(r * ) = g(r 0 ) and leads to a zero operating profit. The corresponding optimal subscription fee T * ≥ 0 by Remark 1 .
Remark 1 indicates that the user has a zero operating profit when the user has the same protection policies with or without insurance, which explains market neutrality. Proposition 1 indicates that the optimal insurance policy leads to a zero operating profit of the insurer, and the optimal protection policy of the user under that insurance policy is the same as the optimal protection policy when there is no insurance.
In the following sections, we present a representative case where the user has two states and two actions and the insurer provides the linear coverage. Analysis of this case will provide structural insights of the policy.
IV. CASE STUDY: TWO-STATE-TWO-ACTION USER AND LINEAR-COVERAGE INSURER
Recall Section II.B, the user in this case has the set of states S ≡ {s G , s B }, where s G and s B indicate good state and bad state, respectively. The losses that associated with the states can be further identified as x G = f (s G ) and x B = f (s B ). The difference between the good state and the bad state is that the user has lower losses at the good state than the bad state, i.e., 0 ≤ x G < x B .
To reduce the losses, the user can choose to take a weak local protection a L or a strong local protection a H , in other words, the user has the action set A = {a L , a H }. The costs of local protections can be captured by c(a L ) and c(a H ). We further use shorthand notations c L and c H to represent the costs of a weak local protection a L and a strong local protection a H , respectively. The differences between a strong local protection and a weak local protection can be identified in detail as follows:
, ∀s ∈ S , which indicates that the user has a higher probability of going to the bad state when he has a weak local protection. (s, a H , s G ), ∀s ∈ S , which indicates that the user has a higher probability of going to the good state when he has a strong local protection. • c L < c H , which indicates that the cost of a strong local protection is higher than the cost of a weak local protection. These differences capture the fact that a strong local protection can make the user more secure but it costs more.
With two states and two actions, the user has only four possible stationary protection policies, i.e., Ω = {π HH , π HL , π LH , π LL }, where
An optimal protection policy π * ∈ Ω can be achieved by solving Problem (4) which minimizes the user's expected total effective losses.
Besides local protections, the user can also purchase the insurance to further mitigate his losses. Note that the insurer has a linear coverage function in this case. We abuse the notation to let r ∈ [0, 1] be a scalar value to represent the coverage level of the insurance, i.e., the insurer will cover rx when the user faces a direct loss of x. Thus, the effective loss of the user can be captured as (1 − r) x. Specially, r = 0 and r = 1 indicate no coverage and full coverage, respectively. As a result, the mappings from the coverage function to the optimal protection policy can be rewritten as g :
The user aims to find the optimal protection policy that minimizes his total effective loss, while the insurer aims to find an insurance policy that maximizes his profit. Methods in the previous section can be used to find the optimal protection policy of the user and the optimal insurance policy for the insurer. Since there are only two states and two actions for the user, and the insurer has a linear coverage function, we can find the equilibrium analytically. In the following subsections, we first obtain the best response g(r) of the user to the insurer's insurance policy {T, r}, then we present the optimal insurance policy {T * , r * } for the insurer.
A. Best Response of the User
One challenge of finding the best response g(r) of the user to the coverage level r is that the optimal protection policy contains the optimal actions at the good state and the bad state, which are correlated, i.e., the optimal action at one state depends on the optimal action at the other state. Thus, we need to take into account both the user's optimal actions with respect to the coverage and their dependencies within states to find the best response of the user. To address this problem, we first consider finding the optimal protection policy of the user for a fixed coverage level.
To Note that the state actions α G and α B are independent of the other, while the protection policy π ∈ Ω is a function of the user's state s ∈ S , and it can be described by π(s G ) = α G and π(s B ) = α B .
After defining the state actions, we can now characterize the optimal protection policy with the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. Let h : S ×
Then, the optimal protection policy π * of the user for a given insurance coverage can be identified as follows:
Proof. See Appendix A. p(s, a H , s c ) − p(s, a L , s c ))(x s c − x s ) . By the definitions of the transition probabilities with weak and strong local protections and the losses for the good state and the bad state, we can achieve
x G − x B < 0. As a result, the slope of h(s, α s c , r) is positive in both cases, and thus, h(s, α s c , r) is linearly increasing on r.
Remark 2 indicates that the user tends to act riskily when the insurer provides full coverage. We can further use the monotonicity in Remark 3 to show that the user will choose to take weak local protections as long as the coverage level is high enough. Proof. This theorem can be easily verified as h(s, α s c , r) is linearly increasing on r under a fixed α s c from Remark 3.
Our previous analysis provides results for a given coverage level r. In the following analysis, we will further achieve the best response of the user for all possible coverage levels r ∈ [0, 1]. Let us first define the value of transition probabilities, which will be used to identify the best response of the user. With the value of the transition probabilities, we can achieve the following proposition regarding the optimal protection policy of the user.
Definition 2. We define the value of transition probabilities
as ρ = (p(s B , a H , s G ) + p(s G , a H , s B )) − (p(s B , a L , s G ) + p(s G , a L , s B )) .(16
Proposition 3. The following facts hold:
• If ρ < 0, the optimal protection policy can not be π LH ;
• If ρ > 0, the optimal protection policy can not be π HL ;
• If ρ = 0, the optimal protection policy can not be π LH and π HL .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 3 indicates that for a certain ρ, the user will never achieve certain protection policies. As a result, the following conclusions on the monotonicity of the optimal protection policy could be obtained:
Remark 4. The following facts hold for the optimal protection policy π * : • If ρ = 0, the user has only two possible protection policies: π HH and π LL . Thus, the user always has π * (s G ) = π * (s B ).
By Remark 2, we can conclude that the user has π * = π LL when r = 1. By Theorem 1, we can conclude that if the optimal protection policy π * = π LL , it then will not change into other policies with the increase of the coverage level. By Proposition 3, we can see that the user will not achieve certain policies under different values of transition probabilities ρ. By summarizing and synthesizing these results, we can find the best response of the user to the insurance as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The user's best response g(r) to the coverage level r can be summarized with the following cases:
• Case 1: If ρ < 0, g(r) has the following three sub-cases:
• Case 2: If ρ > 0, g(r) has the following three sub-cases:
(r) has the following two sub-cases:
We can see from these cases that the user tends to choose weak local protections with the increase of the coverage level. The coverage levels when the user switches to the weak local protections are referred as switching coverage levels r G and r B for the good state and the bad state, respectively. A detailed description of each case and the results of r G and r B are provided in the following proposition. h(s, α s c , r) with the coverage level r = 0. Case 1: If ρ < 0, the user will first decrease his local protection at the bad state with the increase of the coverage level.
Proposition 5. The different cases of the user's optimal protection policy in Proposition 4 are determined first by the value of the transition probabilities ρ, and each sub-case is further determined by
• Case 1(a): When h(s G , a H , 0) < 0 and h(s B , a H , 0) < 0, both r G and r B exist, and they are given by
.
It can be verified that
only r G exists, and it is given by 
only r B exists, and it is given by 
there are no switches, and the user takes weak local protections at both states for all r ∈ [0, 1].
Propositions 4 and 5 have summarized the best response of the user to the coverage level into several different cases. Case 1(c), 2(c), and 3(b) represent situations when the costs of local protections are high and the user has no incentive to take strong local protections, and thus the user takes weak local protections for any coverage levels. Case 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), 2(c), and 3(a) indicate situations when the costs of the strong local protections are reasonable. However, once the insurer provides a higher coverage level, the user tends to take weak local protections to save the total costs and minimize the losses.
We can see that the user tends to take weak local protections with the increase of the coverage level, and this reckless behavior is often referred as the Peltzman effects. One critical impact of the Peltzman effects is that the user may face even higher risks knowing that he is protected by the insurance, and the insurer is required to cover the extra losses caused by the user's reckless behaviors.
In this subsection, we have fully captured the best response of the user to the coverage level with several cases. The conditions and analysis of each case have been provided in detail. We notice from the Peltzman effect that the user tends to take weak local protections when the coverage level is high. In the following subsection, we will fully analyze the insurer's optimal insurance policy and its impacts on the user and the insurer.
B. Optimal Insurance Policy
The interactions between the two-state two-action user and the linear coverage insurer can be summarized as follows: the insurer charges a premium T ∈ R ≥0 at time t = 0 to the user, and the insurer will provide a coverage of rx when the user faces a loss of x at time t > 0, where r ∈ [0, 1] indicates the coverage level. Note that before offering the insurance policy, the insurer can analyze the user's future risks by observing the initial state of the user. A rational insurer will only provide the insurance to the users with good initial states. As a result, recall Section III.C, the insurer's problem (14) with linear coverage function can be written as follows:
where Γ(r) is the operating profit of the user for a coverage level of r. Γ(r) > 0, Γ(r) = 0, and Γ(r) < 0 indicate a positive, zero, and negative operating profit, respectively. s G indicates that the initial state of the user is the good state. Note that for any coverage level r, the highest premium that can be charged is g(r), r) , as the user will not purchase the insurance if the costs of taking the insurance is too high. The constraint in (17) captures the fact that the premium must be greater than 0, which is always true when the user provides a linear coverage as stated in the following proposition. g(r) , r) ≥ 0 always holds for linear coverage r.
Proof. See Appendix C.
As a result, we can achieve the optimal insurance policy by finding the optimal coverage level r that maximizes Γ(r) in (17) . Note that J (s, g(0), 0) and J(s, g(r) , 0) can be easily solved by (10) with the optimal protection policies g(0) and g(r), respectively. By comparing the operating profit Γ(r) for r ∈ [0, 1], we can find r * , and thus achieve the optimal insurance policy {T * , r * } with the maximum profit. To simplify representations, we define the weighted loss function (s B ,α B ,s G ) ) .
(19) The optimal insurance policies for each case in Proposition 4 can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 7. The optimal insurance policy {T * , r * } satisfies:
• Case 1(a): r * ∈ [0, r B ] and T * = r * k(s G , a H ; a H ).
•
• Case 2(a):
For all the cases, the operating profit under the optimal insurance policy satisfies Γ(r * ) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
We can see from the optimal insurance policies that the premium is linear on the coverage level, which can be summarized as the linear insurance policy principle. Moreover, all the optimal insurance policies will lead to a zero operating profit for the insurer, which indicates a zero-operating profit principle. Note that the optimal insurance policies usually provide a limited coverage, and the insurer will have a negative profit when the coverage is high. In that case, the user tends to act recklessly due to the Peltzman effect, which will result in high risks and high losses of the user, and the insurer is required to cover the extra losses caused by such effect, which leads to a negative profit of him.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we first present numerical experiments on two-state two-action user and the linear coverage insurer to verify our previous analytical results. We then present numerical experiments on four-state three-action user, linear coverage insurer, and threshold coverage insurer.
A. Two-State Two-Action User and Linear Coverage Insurer
We consider the interactions between a two-state two-action user and a linear coverage insurer. The detailed analysis has been provided in the previous sections. In this subsection, we aim to verify our analysis with numerical experiments.
The two states are identified by a good state s G and a bad state s B . The user has losses of x G = 0 and x B = 10 for the good state and the bad state, respectively. To avoid going to the bad state, the user can take some local protections a H . Note that he also has a choice of not taking any local protections a L . The costs of the local protections can be captured by c L = 0 and c H = 1.
On the one hand, if the user does not adopt any local protections a L , the transition probabilities can be cap-
On the other hand, if the user takes local protections a H , the transition probabilities can be captured
We can see from the transition probabilities that the user has a larger probability of going to the good state when he adopts the local protections. The value of the transition probabilities satisfies ρ < 0. The analysis of this case has been summarized as Case 1 in Proposition 4, 5, and 7.
Let γ = 0.9, we can get by computations that h(
08, and h(s B , α G = a L , r = 0) = 0.10. Thus, the best response of the user should follow Case 1(a) with r G = 0.6296 and r B = 0.0889. With dynamic programming, the best response and the corresponding expected total effective losses of the user are shown in Figs.4(a,b) . We can see that they coincide with our previous analysis. Figs.4(c,d) show the maximum premium of the insurance policy and the operating profit of the insurer with respect to the coverage level r. With the increase of the coverage level, the losses of the user is decreasing; the insurer will charge higher premiums; the operating profit starts with 0 and then becomes negative. The insurer has zero-operating profit principle and linear insurance policy principle when the coverage level is low; however, he has a negative operating profit when the coverage level is high. Thus, the optimal insurance policy {T * , r * } satisfies r * ∈ [0, r B ] and T * = r * k(s G , a H ; a H ), where r B = 0.6296 and k(s G , a H ; a H ) = 21.9512. Moreover, the operating profit under the optimal insurance policy satisfies Γ(r * ) = 0.
B. Four-State Three-Action User and Linear Coverage Insurer
As we can see from the two-state two-action user, the analysis is more involved as the various cases caused by different transition probabilities, losses, and costs of local protections. 1 , a, s G ) p(s B,1 , a, s B,1 ) p(s B,1 , a, s B,2 ) p(s B,1 , a, s B,3 )  p(s B,2 , a, s G ) p(s B,2 , a, s B,1 ) p(s B,2 , a, s B,2 ) p(s B,2 , a, s B,3 )  p(s B,3 , a, s G ) p(s B,3 , a, s B,1 ) p(s B,3 , a, s B,2 ) p(s B,3 , a, We can see that with better local protections, the user has a larger probability of going to the good state and a smaller probability of going to the bad state. Let γ = 0.9, with the dynamic programming, and we can find the best response and the expected total effective losses of the user to the linear coverage insurance, which are shown in Figs.5(a,b) . We can see from (a,b) that the user decreases his local protections with the increase of the coverage level, and the user also has lower expected total effective losses with higher coverage levels. By plotting the premium and the operating profit with respect to the coverage level as shown in Figs.5(c,d) , we can see that with the increase of the coverage level, the premium is linearly increasing. Moreover, the maximum operating profit that can be achieved by the insurer is 0. Thus, the Peltzman effect, the zero-operating profit principle, and the linear insurance policy principle still hold in this case. We can also observe that the optimal insurance policy tends to provide limited coverage levels, and higher coverages can lead to negative operating profits of the insurer.
C. Four-State Three-Action User and Threshold Coverage Insurer
In the previous subsection, we have presented a four-state three-action user under the linear coverage insurance. In this subsection, we present a threshold coverage insurance and show its impact on the user and the insurer. The threshold policy has two coverage levels r 0 = 0.5 and r 1 = 0.9, which are distinguished by a threshold x r ∈ [x G , x B,3 ]. When the loss of the user x ≤ x r , the insurer will provide a coverage r 0 x, otherwise, the insurer will provide a coverage r 1 x. Such type of threshold policy has been used a lot in reality, for example, health insurance and car insurance. The objective of the insurer is to maximize his operating profit by finding the optimal threshold x * r and the associated premium T * . The best response and the expected total effective losses of the user are shown in Fig.6(a,b) , and we can see from them that the user will decrease his local protections with the decrease of the threshold x r , which indicates that the user tends to act recklessly knowing that he will be covered even with a smaller amount of losses. Moreover, we can see that the premium decreases with the increase of the threshold x r , which shows that the insurer will charge more to provide better coverages.
The maximum operating profit that can be achieved by the insurer is 0. As a result, this case shows the similar Peltzman effect and zero-operating profit principle as in the previous cases. Furthermore, the optimal insurance policy requires a higher threshold; otherwise, the insurer will face a negative operating profit.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a dynamic moral-hazard type of principal-agent model to study the cyber-insurance and its impacts on the cyber-security. The dynamics and correlations of the cyber-risks have been modeled by Markov decision processes where the user aims to find the optimal protection policy to mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks. Both the computational and analytical tools have been presented to design the optimal cyber-insurance contracts. We have studied and fully analyzed a case where the user has two states and two actions, and the insurer provides linear coverage insurance. We have shown the Peltzman effect that the user tends to act more recklessly under the insurance. We have presented the optimal linear insurance policy and the zerooperating profit principle of the optimal cyber insurance policy. Numerical experiments have been used to corroborate our results and further demonstrate the case study with a fourstate three-action user and his interactions with linear coverage insurance and threshold coverage insurance. The Peltzman effect and the zero-operating profit principle have been shown to hold in these cases. One direction of future research is the investigation of cyber-insurance policies over complex networks such as scale-free and small-world networks with dynamic cyber-risks.
APPENDIX A
To simplify the representations, we first define the discounted transition probabilities as follows:
Remark 5. The following facts hold for ρ:
Furthermore, we define the transition probability eigenvalue function I p : A × A → R ≥0 as follows:
Remark 6. The following facts hold for I p :
Recall (10), the following equations hold:
By solving the two linear equations in (22) together, we can achieve J(s, π, r) as follows: , ∀s ∈ S ; (23) As a result, by plugging (23) into (11), the optimal protection policy π * can be found by solving the following problems together: .
(25)
The optimal values are υ(s G , r) and υ(s B , r), respectively. Notice that (24) and (25) are related as the optimal state action of one problem is used in the other problem, and the optimal protection policy π * requires solving both problems together. To find the optimal protection policy, we first solve a single problem and find the optimal state action α * s given the state action at the other state, and then we achieve the optimal protection policy π * by combing the results of the optimal state actions for both states together.
To capture the relations between the expected total effective losses and the state actions, we first define the action dependent expected total effective losses. 
We further identify the relations between the expected total effective losses J and the action dependent expected total effective losses J in the following remark. We can now define the optimal state actions as follows: With Remark 7 and Definition 4, we can find the optimal protection policy π * using the action dependent expected total effective loss J, which is summarized in the following theorem. 
As a result, we now have an iterative way of finding the optimal protection policy π * under a given coverage level r as follows: the first step is that we randomly pick an initial bad state action α (0) B ∈ A , then we obtain α until the pair α * G and α * B achieves convergence, and the optimal insurance policy π * satisfies π * (s G ) = α * G and π * (s B ) = α * B . Note that finding the user's best response g(r) is costly by the iterative methods as we need to iterate over all the possible coverage levels r ∈ R. However, we can achieve the analytical solutions by further analyzing the problems. First of all, notice that the action dependent expected total effective losses (26) and (27) are both linear in the coverage level r as identified in the following remark. ,α B ,s B )x G + p(s G ,α G ,s B ) As a result, if ρ < 0, we can achieve the following inequalities: (a) h(s G , a H , r) < h(s G , a L , r); (b) h(s B , a H , r) <  h(s B , a L , r); (c) h(s G , a H , r) < h(s B , a H , r); (d) h(s G , a L , r) <  h(s B , a L , r); (e) h(s G , a H , r) < h(s B , a L , r) . Note that when the user achieves π LH , we have h(s G , a H , r) > 0 and h(s B , a L , r) < 0, which indicates that h(s B , a L , r) < h(s G , a H , r) , however, it violates Inequality (e), thus, the user will never achieve π LH when ρ < 0.
If ρ > 0, we have ( , a H , r) , respectively. Thus, the user will never achieve π LH and π HL when ρ = 0.
